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Abstract
Venture projects are fraught with exogenous market risk and endogenous
agency risk. We apply a real options perspective to analyze the investment de-
cision of the venture capitalist (VC) in this set-up. The solutions presented
are conflictive: the VC reduces his exposure to exogenous risk by delaying in-
vestments to wait for informational updates (delay option), but he mitigates
endogenous risk by advancing investments to discover entrepreneur’s effort. So
far, papers focus on the optimal timing of investments considering independence
of exogenous and endogenous risk. We show that interdependence of exogenous
risk and endogenous risk exists. We find that endogenous risk prompts the VC
to accelerate the discovery process when exogenous risk is high, and to abandon
the delay option when it is most valuable.
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1 Introduction
Venture firms operate in highly dynamic markets, where future market conditions are
particularly uncertain and can change very fast. In this environment, the venture
capitalist (VC) has to cope with two tasks: he has to manage his investment risk
with respect to market uncertainty, and he has to manage the project with respect to
agency conflicts. The market uncertainty describes an exogenous risk that impacts the
prospects of the venture project, such as technological progress within the industry,
trending consumer behavior or competitor’s response to new products and services.
It is out of the control of the VC or the entrepreneur, making the venture project
basically a bet on future market conditions. The agency conflicts between the VC and
the entrepreneur describe an endogenous risk that impacts the successful realization of
the project, such as uncertainty about the effort of the entrepreneur.
In this set-up, we analyze the investment decision of the VC in a real options
framework. Real options describe future decision rights, rights but not obligations to
take some action in the future. This provides a decision maker flexibility to act upon
informational updates (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1982; Trigeorgis,
1996). The real options theory suggests that investments are exposed to two types of
risks: the exogenous risk that is irreducible through organizational activity, and the
endogenous risk that can be substantially influenced by organizational activity (Folta,
1998; McGrath et al., 2004).
By applying staged capital infusion, the VC creates future investment opportunities.
Once the VC committed an initial investment to a venture project, he receives the right
to participate in future financing rounds of the project. Furthermore, the VC decides
whether to immediately commit funds to advance the development of the project, or
to defer investments to slow down the development.
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On the one hand, the VC can reduce his exposer to the exogenous risk by deferring
investments to wait for informational updates about future market conditions: if mar-
ket conditions turn out to be favorable, the VC commits additional funds to capitalize
on the growth prospects of the project. Conversely, if market conditions turn out to be
bad, the VC abandons the project to confine high downside losses (Li, 2008). On the
other hand, the VC mitigates the endogenous risk by learning about the behavior of the
entrepreneur (Chi & McGuire, 1996): by investing the VC observes the performance
of the project and aggregates beliefs about the effort of the entrepreneur.
The solutions presented to exogenous and endogenous risks are conflictive: with re-
spect to the exogenous risk, the VC defers investments to confine downside losses. With
respect to the endogenous risk, the VC advances investments to discover the effort of
the entrepreneur. So far, papers focus on the optimal timing of investments consider-
ing independence of exogenous and endogenous risks (Li, 2008; Gompers, 1995; Neher,
1999; Bergemann & Hege, 1998). Interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risks
have not been considered yet. We assume that this interdependence exists. The reason
is as follows: entrepreneurs will have motivation to expend their effort if future market
conditions are seemingly favorable and prospects of the venture firm are high but their
motivation might decrease if expectations about future market conditions change and
depress the firm’s prospects. The interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk
refers to the idea of a relative value of private benefits. In periods of high market un-
certainty, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from the project is downgraded. Private
benefits from managing the firm become more attractive to the entrepreneur relative to
the successful realization of the project. As a consequence, the entrepreneur’s incentive
to behave opportunistically increases.
We introduce a formal model to show how agency conflicts tighten in a world of
uncertainty and analyze the resulting decision making of the VC. To manage agency
3
conflicts in times of high market risk, the VC has to accelerate investments to advance
the learning process. As a consequence, the VC suffers opportunity loss because he
abandons the delay option when it is most valuable. We find empirical support for our
theory. We analyze a sample of individual European VC funding from 2003 to 2015.
The joint effect of time-serial market risk and cross-sectional agency risk accelerates
investments to venture projects.
The remainder proceeds as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the related lit-
erature, in section 3 we introduce a formal model to analyze the decision making of
the VC, in section 4 we test the implications from the formal model empirically and
conduct robustness checks, section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
In a set-up with exogenous and endogenous risks, the VC’s funding decision can be
analyzed in a real options framework (Hsu, 2010; Li, 2008). Real options are future
decision rights; rights but not obligations to take some action in the future. Future
decision rights offer a decision maker flexibility to act upon informational updates
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1982; Trigeorgis, 1996). In the real world,
decisions are not static. For example, a decision maker can defer the initiation of a
project to wait for additional information about future market condition. Once started
the project, he can abandon it at any given stage of development if environmental
conditions turn out to be bad, or he can expand the project if environmental condi-
tions turn out to be positive (Trigeorgis, 1996). In venture finance, VCs use stage
financing to create future investment opportunities. Once the VC committed an initial
investment to a venture project, he usually receives the right to participate in future
financing rounds (Li, 2008). Furthermore, this gives the VC the opportunity whether
to concentrate funds in early stages of the project or defer investments shifting them
to later stages. This decision is based on the information available and the information
gathering process.
The exogenous risk in venture projects is related to unexpected market develop-
ments, e.g. technological progress within the industry, trending consumer behavior or
competitor’s response to new products and services that depress the project’s expected
value (Li, 2008). Exogenous risk is is out of the control of a decision maker and resolves
primarily with the passage of time (McGrath, 1997; Pindyck, 1993; Dixit & Pindyck,
1994). In this case, the timing of investments can be seen as a decision whether to
hold the current option to invest and wait for informational updates about the market
conditions or to invest immediately and capitalize on the information available (delay
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option) (Li, 2008). If market conditions turn out to be favorable, the VC commits
additional funds to earn a high return. Conversely, if market conditions turn out to
be bad, the VC abandons the project to confine high downside losses (Li, 2008). If
uncertainty about future market conditions is high, the option to wait for informational
updates is economically more valuable than immediate investment (Dixit & Pindyck,
1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1982; Trigeorgis, 1996). Recent research shows that VCs
delay the initiating and continuation of venture projects when market uncertainty is
particular severe (Li, 2008; Li & Mahoney, 2011).
The endogenous risk in venture projects is related to agency conflicts between the
VC and the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur inhibits the role of a contracting agent
and owns human capital, such as specific skills or knowledge, essential to realize the
venture project (Hart & Moore, 1994). Furthermore, venture project’s are character-
ized through a high fraction of intangible assets and growth opportunities giving great
discretion to the action of the entrepreneur (Amit et al., 1998; Bergemann & Hege,
1998; Cornelli & Yosha, 2003; Burchardt et al., 2014; Gompers, 1995; Neher, 1999).
The entrepreneur might be unwilling to expend effort to maximize shareholder’s value
(Gompers, 1995; Chan et al., 1990; Hansen, 1992), or be willing to extract informa-
tional rents from information asymmetries (Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Hellmann, 1998;
Kirilenko, 2001).
When risks can be substantially influenced by organizational activity, the VC can
reduce his exposer by learning (Chi & McGuire, 1996): by investing the VC observes the
performance of the project and aggregate beliefs about the effort of the entrepreneur.
To avoid an inefficient continuation of the venture project, the VC implements various
mechanisms like contingent control allocation (Chan et al., 1990; Kirilenko, 2001),
convertible securities (Casamatta, 2003; Cornelli & Yosha, 2003; Repullo & Suarez,
2004; Schmidt, 2003), and staging (Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Neher, 1999).
6
We argue that investing is always possible. Hence, in a world of uncertainty, the
option to defer investments is economically more valuable than investing. Any char-
acteristics of the project that force the VC to abandon the delay option must arise
opportunity loss.
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3 Formal Model
3.1 The Venture Project
We describe a venture project as a one-shot (static) problem. A financially constrained
entrepreneur E owns a project with uncertain returns. The project is financed by
a venture capitalist V C. E provides effort ε, with ε = {0, 1}. The effort of the
entrepreneur is a critical resource for the success of the firm. Physical assets purchased
have no value to the V C without the effort of the entrepreneur (Hart & Moore, 1994).
The V C and the E are considered to be risk-neutral. The VC provides the total
investment in equity financing only. The V C and E agree on a sharing contract in
t = 0. The sharing contract defines the entrepreneur’s share SE of the project’s payoff
and the timing of the investments. The project requires a total investment I to be
completed.
The VC follows an investment path i0, ..., iT to provide funds. The investment path
gives the VC the opportunity to time his investments. The funding is completed at
time T with 0 ≤ T ≤ 1 and IT = I = ∑T0 it. Investments are sunk once committed to
the project. Time is standardized to the interval [0, 1]. The discount rate is d = 0.
In t = 1, an exogenous stochastic shock pi is realized with probability (1 − p),
with p ∈ [0, 1]. Probability (1 − p) is related to the level of exogenous risk and is
ex-ante known by the E and the V C. The project is valueless if the shock is realized,
otherwise the project generates the payoff V (ε). The project’s value follows a Bernoulli
distribution
V (ε) =

0 w. Pr. (1− p)
V (ε) w. Pr. p
(1)
with V (1) > 0 and V (0) = 0. In other words, the E has to expend effort to realize the
8
project.
Probability (1− p) is out of the control of the E and the V C, and resolves with the
passage of time. There is a confidence level θpi(T ) at time T that pi is realized in t = 1.
It describes the aggregation of beliefs about the future market conditions over time.
θpi(T ) is based on the square-root-of-time rule. The rule allows higher frequency risk
estimates to be scaled down to a lower frequency. It is commonly used when financial
risk is time aggregated. The confidence level θpi(T ) is
θpi(T ) = T 0.5 (2)
3.2 Maximization Function of the Venture Capitalist
Exogenous risk (1 − p) constrains the project’s expected payoff. I0 is a non-arbitrary
staging path of the V C that immediately invests I in t = 0. The V C’s expected payoff
P (0)V C is
P (0)V C = −I0 + (1− SE)pV (ε) (3)
Over time, the V C becomes more confident about the exogenous stochastic shock pi
being realized in t = 1. I1 is a non-arbitrary investment path, where the investment
process is completed in t = 1. To show the impact of delaying investments, we simplify
the staging path I1 to the situation where the VC invest I in t = 1. Hence, the total
investment is delayed until uncertainty about the realization of the shock is revealed.
The VC only invests if pi is not realized. The expected payoff P (1)V C is
P (1)V C = (−I1 + (1− SE)V (ε))p (4)
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The staging path provides the V C the option to delay investments until he is more
confident about the realization of the exogenous stochastic shock. The economic value
of this delay option D(T ) is positively related to the probability (1 − p), and delay
T > 0.
D(T ) = P (T )V C − P (0)V C (5)
= θpi(T )[−I(p− 1)] (6)
The V C maximizes his total payoff P (T )V C
P (T )V C = argmax
T
{(1− SE)pV (ε)− I + θpi(T )[−I(p− 1)]} (7)
3.3 Participation Constraint of the Entrepreneur
E chooses between the two effort levels ε = 1, and ε = 0. If E expend effort (ε = 1),
he can realize V (1) with probability p. Since E does not provide funds, the delay of
investments has no economic value to him. His expected payoff P (t, ε)E is P (1, ε)E =
P (0, ε)E = P (ε)E, where P (1, ε)E specifies the case when the V C invests I in t = 1
and P (0, ε)E specifies the case when the V C invests I in t = 0.
Since tasks of the entrepreneur are highly interdependent and can not be moni-
tored accurately, his effort level ε can not be observed directly. The V C discovers the
effort of the entrepreneur by aggregating beliefs conditional on the performance of the
project. The discovery process is characterized by some imprecision α, with α ∈ [0, 1].
Imprecision α is equal to zero if the effort of the entrepreneur and the performance of
the firm are perfectly correlated. Conversely, if the effort of the entrepreneur and the
performance of the firm are not perfectly correlated, it is α > 0. This describes the
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level of project’s endogenous risk. Endogenous risk differs across projects and is related
to the discretion project’s assets provide to the action of the E, e.g. when tasks of the
entrepreneur are highly interdependent, observing the performance of the project will
provide only little information about his true effort (Zenger, 1994).
In that, α defines a certain fraction of the investment I that E can divert for
private use if he choose ε = 0. Choosing ε = 0, E degrades the project in T and earns
imprecision cost C. It describes his dis-utility of effort.
Given imprecision, the V C has to discover the effort ε in an endogenous process
to efficiently reduce agency risk: he updates his expectation about E’s effort ε con-
ditional on the performance of the project. A bad performance indicates ε = 0. The
performance of the project is observed when it is continued; funds are required to pur-
chase assets to continue the project. In that, the discovery process is controlled by
the V C conditional on the rate of investments. A high investment rate (small values
of T ) allows the VC to observe the performance of the project early and to discover
entrepreneur’s true effort ε sooner. By investing, the VC implements a set of binding
provisions to reduce agency conflicts and confine imprecision costs. Hence, imprecision
cost C is conditional on the rate of investments.
C = αIT (8)
Hellmann (1998) predicts that the more wealth constrained the entrepreneur is, the
more likely is investor’s control. Furthermore, Kaplan & Stromberg (2003) show that
V C’s control rights are allocated in a way that the V C obtain full control if the venture
project performs poorly. If the V C discovers true effort ε = 0 in T , then the V C gains
full control over the project to punish E. In this case, E can not divert funds for private
use. However, since the V C cannot realize the project without E, payoff P (T )V C is
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zero as well. E maximizes
P (ε)E = argmax
ε
{sEpV (ε)− C} (9)
The entrepreneur will choose ε = 0 if
C > sEpV (ε) (10)
C
sEpV (ε)
> 1 (11)
The ratio describes the relative value of private benefits. This is the amount of funds
diverted for private use (E chooses ε = 0), relative to the payoff from the project
(E chooses ε = 1). E’s incentive to behave opportunistically (to chooses ε = 0), is
positively related to probability (1 − p) that the exogenous shock pi occurs, and the
level of imprecision α. The entrepreneur is indifferent between ε = 1 and ε = 0 when
his expected payoff from the project equals imprecision cost C. The participation
constraint P.C.E that incentivizes E to chose ε = 1 is
sEpV (1) ≥ C (12)
sEpV (1)− αIt ≥ 0 (13)
3.4 Solution without Imprecision
In the first best case, there is no imprecision. By definition this is α = 0 and there is
no imprecision cost.
C = αIT = 0 (14)
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Inserting C = 0 into the participation constraint of the entrepreneur P.C.E, the mini-
mum payoff P (1)E to incentivize E to chooseε = 1 is
P (1)E∗∗ = 0 (15)
The E earns no surplus over his cost of capital. The V C maximizes P (T )V C . T ∗∗ and
S∗∗E is
T ∗∗ = 1 (16)
S∗∗E = 0 (17)
The payoff to the V C is
P (T ∗∗)V C = [−I + V (1)]p (18)
The VC earns all the payoff from the project and the total value of the delay option.
3.5 Solution with Imprecision
In the second best case, imprecision exists. By definition this is α > 0. The effort of
the E is not perfectly correlated with the observed performance of the project. For
T > 0 imprecision cost C arise. The V C has to vest share SE of project’s payoff to E
to incentivize him to choose ε = 1. With respect to the participation constraint of the
entrepreneur P.C.E, SE is
P.C.E : sEpV (1) = αIT (19)
SE =
αIT
pV (1) (20)
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For I = 1 and V (1) = 1, we maximize the payoff P (T )V C of the V C. T ∗ and S∗E are
T ∗ = (p− 1)
2
4α2 (21)
S∗E =
(p− 1)2
4αp (22)
Endogenous risk α and exogenous risk (1 − p) increase the share SE vested to the
entrepreneur and reduce the residuum share of the VC. The payoffs to the V C and the
E are
P (T ∗)V C = (1− S∗E)pV (1)− I + θpi(T ∗)[−I(p− 1)] (23)
P (1)E = αIT ∗ (24)
The V C and E share the surplus from the project. The E earns the imprecision cost
over his cost of capital. The V C receives the residuum payoff and the value of the
delay option.
3.6 Opportunity Loss from Imprecision
In a world of uncertainty (1− p) > 0, the option to delay investments is economically
more valuable than immediate investing. This is shown in (6): the value of delay
option D(T ) is positively related to the probability (1− p) that the exogenous shock is
realized. Since delay T ∗ is negatively related to the level of imprecision α, agency risk
forces the VC to advance investments. If (1 − p) is high, opportunity loss must arise.
Opportunity loss is present if D(T ) < D(1).
In the first best solution, the V C invests I in t = 1 and realizes D(1). There is no
opportunity loss. In the second best solution, the VC maximizes his payoff P (T )V C
with respect to the participation constraint of the entrepreneur P.C.E. For T > 0
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imprecision cost C arise. For C > 0, the V C has to vest share SE > 0 to E, to
incentivize him to choose ε = 1. The VC will benefit from deferring investments as
long as the marginal profits from the delay option exceed the marginal compensation
of E.
∂P (0)V C
∂t
+ ∂D(T )
∂t
<
∂P (1)E
∂t
(25)
∂([1− αT
pV (1) ]pV (1)− I + T 0.5[−I(p− 1)])
∂t
<
αT
pV (1)pV (1)
∂t
(26)
For I = 1 and V (1) = 1,
−α− (p− 1)2T 0.5 < α (27)
The VC realizes the total value of the delay option if T = 1. For T = 1, (27) is
α∗ <
(1− p)
4 (28)
The result shows the critical level of imprecision α∗ at which the V C realizes the total
value of the delay option D(1). Formula (28) demonstrates that the critical level of
imprecision α∗ is multiplicative with respect to the probability (1− p).
In table 1 and figure 1, we give a numerical example to illustrate the impact of
exogenous and endogenous risks on the VC’s optimal timing of investments T ∗. For
(1−p) > 0 and T ∗ < 1 opportunity loss arise. We present the resulting opportunity loss
D(1)−D(T ∗) in table 1 and figure 2. For any level of endogenous risk α, opportunity
loss decreases in exogenous risk (1− p). This means that the VC defers investments to
capitalize on informational updates if exogenous risk is high. Conversely, for any level
of exogenous risk (1− p), opportunity loss increases in the level of endogenous risk α.
This means that the VC accelerates investments and abandons a fraction of the delay
option to initiate the discovery of entrepreneur’s effort if endogenous risk is high. In
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that, endogenous risk restricts the value of the delay option.
The VC accelerates the discovery of entrepreneur’s effort in exogenous risk (1− p).
This is because the relative value of entrepreneur’s private benefit C
sEpV (ε) increases in
exogenous risk, increasing his incentive to behave opportunistically. As a consequence,
the V C has to abandon a larger proportion of the delay option when it is most valuable.
This accelerates his opportunity loss. We derive three testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: VCs delay investments if exogenous market risk is high.
Hypothesis 2: VCs advance investments if endogenous agency risk is high.
Hypothesis 3: VCs accelerate investments if exogenous market risk and en-
dogenous agency risk are high.
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Table 1: Numerical Illustration
T* D(1)-D(T*)
α α
0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
0.75 0.879 0.694 0.563 0.465 0.391 0.047 0.125 0.188 0.239 0.281
0.7 0.766 0.605 0.490 0.405 0.340 0.088 0.156 0.210 0.255 0.292
(1− p) 0.65 0.660 0.522 0.423 0.349 0.293 0.122 0.181 0.228 0.266 0.298
0.6 0.563 0.444 0.360 0.298 0.250 0.150 0.200 0.240 0.273 0.300
0.55 0.473 0.373 0.303 0.250 0.210 0.172 0.214 0.248 0.275 0.298
We illustrate the optimal timing of the investment as a function of the delay of investments T∗ in Fig. 1, and the resulting opportunity
loss D(1)−D(T∗) in Fig. 2; for α ∈ [0.4, 0.6]; (1− p) ∈ [0.55, 0.75].
0.75
0.550.2
(1-p)
0.650.6
0.4
0.55
0.6
alpha
T*
0.60.5
0.8
0.45
1
0.550.4
Figure 1: Delay T ∗
0.75
0.7
(1-p)
0.6500.6
0.55 0.6
alpha
0.1
0.5
D
(1)
 - D
(T
*)
0.45 0.55
0.2
0.4
0.3
Figure 2: Opportunity Loss D(1)−D(T ∗)
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4 Empirical Approach
4.1 Data
Our sample covers individual financing rounds from venture projects based in 15 Euro-
pean countries1 for the period from 2003/01/01 to 2015/12/31 from Dow Jones Venture
Source. The sample period covers the post-dotcom bubble period and the financial cri-
sis of 2007. Furthermore, the sample period covers the European sovereign debt-crisis
in 2009 that came along with an expansive monetary policy of the European Central
Bank.
We exclude venture firms from the energy and utilities sector. Energy-related in-
frastructure projects, and renewable energy production was strongly supported and
highly regulated by the European Union within the sample period.
We use sector classifications provided by Dow Jones Venture Source. Sector classi-
fications are matched to the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard) classifica-
tion scheme based on industry descriptions. We aggregate industries’ end-of-the-year
business ratios of listed firms from Compustat global.
4.2 Econometric Method
We analyze the the duration of a financing round. This is defined as the time between
the completion of two subsequent financing rounds. An increasing duration charac-
terizes the delay of an investment. Conversely, a decreasing duration characterizes an
advancement of investments (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
We use a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the joint effect of exogenous
and endogenous risks on the duration of the financing round. The method allows us
1Belgium, Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Sweden
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to separately estimate a time-series effect of the exogenous risk, a cross-sectional effect
of the endogenous risk, and a joint effect of exogenous and endogenous risks.
We use an accelerated-failure time model to fit information about the duration into
a parametric regression model. We model duration by the survival time of the financing
round. Failure is the completion of the round. The censoring date is the date of the
initial public offering, acquisition or bankruptcy. Ongoing investments are censored
after five years (1825 days). To follow each event for five years, we restrict our analysis
to financing events that took place between 2003/01/01 and 2010/12/31. This leaves
us with 7,336 observations.
The survival function S(t) is the probability that a financing round is completed later
than t
S(t) = P (T > t)
The failure time is modeled by a linear effect composed of the covariates and a random
disturbance term .  is a vector of errors assumed to come from a known distribution
and σ is an unknown scale parameter. We fit the model to the natural logarithm of
the duration and Weilbull distribution of the error term. The model fits the paper’s
focus on the timing of investments since the estimation parameters in the accelerated
failure time model can be interpreted as the influence of the explanatory variables on
the failure time. This model is commonly used in duration studies (Gompers, 1995; Li,
2008). The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood method with a Newton-
Raphson algorithm. The standard errors of the parameter estimates are estimated
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from the inverse of the observed information matrix. The model is
Log(Duration) = α + γt(Exogenoust) + βi(Endogenousi)
+ δt,i(Exogenoust*Endogenousi)
+ ζi(Controlsi) + σt,i
where Duration is the duration of the financing round; Exogenoust is a time-series
variable that captures the exogenous market risk, γt estimates the time-series effect
of exogenous market risk on the duration of the financing round. Endogenousi is
a vector of cross-sectional variables that captures firm’s exposure to the endogenous
agency risk. βi estimates the cross-sectional effect of endogenous agency risk on the
duration of the financing round. δt,i is the joint effect of exogenous and endogenous
risks on the duration of the financing round. Controlsi is a vector of individual control
variables, ζi is the vector of its estimation parameters.
4.3 Measures
4.3.1 Exogenous Risk
The exogenous market risk is related to unexpected market developments that are out
of the control of the entrepreneur and the VC (Li, 2008; McGrath, 1997; Pindyck, 1993;
Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). We relate the exogenous risk to market price volatility. It
captures the level of accumulated market uncertainty (Cochrane, 2005). VCs delay
investments to ongoing projects and the initiation of new projects if the aggregate
market volatility is high (Li, 2008, Li & Mahoney 2011). We use the level of the Euro
Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VStoxx 50) at the funding date to measure the exogenous
risk. The index is based on Euro Stoxx 50 options prices and reflects the one year
ahead market expectation of volatility.
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4.3.2 Endogenous Risk
We relate the endogenous agency risk to tasks of a start-up entrepreneur in developing
an innovative product, and scaling the venture firm. First, tasks in developing an
innovative product are highly interdependent (Bishop, 1987), e.g technological process
might accelerate or constrain the speed of developing an innovative product. The
early performance of the project is conditional on technological process in that the
entrepreneur reaches milestones faster if the technological environment is favorable.
From the perspective of the VC, it is difficult to discover whether a good performance
is solely up-on the effort of the entrepreneur or results from a favorable technological
environment. This is in particular the case for tasks where the entrepreneur has to
expend primarily cognitive effort, because the entrepreneur’s true cognitive effort can
not be discovered by observing his actions (Zenger, 1994). When the correlation of
entrepreneur’s true effort and the performance of the firm is highly imprecise, the VC
has to advance the development of the firm to aggregate beliefs about the entrepreneur’s
true effort. As a consequence, agency risk is high if the project requires substantial
cognitive effort to develop a new innovative product. We relate the effort required to
develop an innovative product to the R&D intensity of the industry. The development
will require substantially more effort of the entrepreneur if the industry is R&D intense.
VCs advance investments to ongoing projects if they operate in R&D intense industries
(Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008). We measure R&D intensity by industry’s median R&D-
expenditures-to-sales ratio at previous year’s end (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
Second, scaling the venture firm is related to the realization of growth opportuni-
ties. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the VC, it is difficult to discover whether
a favorable performance - e.g. increasing sales volumes - results from high effort of
the entrepreneur or are due to a favorable growth environment. This is especially the
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case because growth opportunities provide the entrepreneur the chance to manipulate
the growth signal revealed to the VC (Cornelli & Yosha, 2003). For example the en-
trepreneur might engage in short term sales activities to reveal a more positive signal
to the VC without increasing his true (long-term) sales effort. When the performance
revealed to the VC is manipulated in such a way, the correlation of entrepreneur’s true
effort and the observed performance of the firm is highly imprecise. The VC has to
advance the development of the firm to aggregate beliefs about the entrepreneur’s true
effort. Agency risk is high if the the venture project implies strong growth opportu-
nities. Firm’s growth opportunities are substantially larger if the industry is charac-
terized by strong growth opportunities. VCs advance investments to ongoing projects
if they operate in an industry characterized by high growth opportunities (Gompers,
1995; Li, 2008). Strong growth opportunities are signaled by a high market-to-book
ratio (Chan & Chen, 1991). We measure growth opportunities by industry’s median
market-to-book ratio at previous year’s end (Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008).
4.3.3 Contract Design
The financing instrument defines whether the VC is more actively involved in the
operations of the project or inherits a passive role. By equity investments the VC
receives power in the board of directors. This provides him with the opportunity
to monitor endogenous performance and approve significant decisions. It possesses
strong governance abilities when compared to debt instruments since it emphasizes
behavior control of the entrepreneur (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This reduce exposure to
endogenous risk and might encourage the VC to take rather advantage of the delay
option than to advance the discovery process. We classify debt-like and an equity-like
instruments. We assume pure debt and convertible debt to posses the characteristics
of a debt instrument, whereas equity swaps and pure equity posses the characteristics
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of an equity instrument.
Small funding amounts limit opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur in that
they reduce the bargaining power of the entrepreneur (Neher, 1999). A small funding
amount will prevent the investor’s claim from a bid down. This reduce exposure to
endogenous risk and might encourage the VC to take advantage of the delay option.
VCs syndicate to obtain a second opinion about the quality of the entrepreneurial
project in the pre-investment phase and to provide improved value-adding in the in-
vestment phase (Lerner, 1994; Brander et al., 2002). Moreover, those tasks are not
independent from each other as an efficient selection of the project increase the ef-
fectiveness of the VC’s involvement (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007). VCs that
syndicate their investment will perform more efficiently allowing them to implement
monitoring and control mechanisms at lower cost. This allows the syndicate to im-
plement closer monitoring and control activities. We classify deals with two or more
investors involved as syndicated investments.
4.3.4 Firm-specific Information
Firm-specific information such as financial statements and interviews with employees
reveals the entrepreneur’s management ability, its motivation and effort. The avail-
ability of such a type of information is linked to the project’s age (Amit et al., 1998).
It acts as a track-record of entrepreneur’s past activities. When uncertainty about the
entrepreneur’s type is reduced, imprecise contracting diminishes. The VC can take
advantage of the delay option instead of initiating a discovery process. We calculate
project’s age counting the days between the start date of the project and the date of
the financing event.
Moreover, venture projects differ in quality. The VC gathers this information in the
screening process (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2007; Sahlman, 1990). The screening
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process, however, is exposed to adverse selection concerns. Higher quality projects
have a more urgent need for capital to finance their future growth (Li, 2008). As
a consequence, entrepreneurs initiating low quality projects have incentive to imitate
higher quality projects to increase their funding. Hence, staging is more important for
projects that pretend to be of high quality, since staged financing rejects low promising
firms (Sahlman, 1990). By controlling for the quality of the project, we separate adverse
selection risk and moral hazard risk, that is the concerns about a misrepresentation of
project’s quality and the concerns about the true effort of the entrepreneur. Moreover,
effort of the entrepreneur is necessary but not sufficient for the success of the firm:
even high quality projects will not succeed without entrepreneur’s effort; however,
even if the entrepreneur expend high effort to a low quality project, it will not succeed.
We measure quality by an ex-post indicator of success which is an exit of the firm
(Gompers, 1995; Li, 2008; Brander et al., 2002; Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Sorenson &
Stuart, 2001). We use information about an exit of the firm based on the information
available on Venture Source at the date of data generation. We classify projects that
had an IPO or tradesale as high quality projects.
4.3.5 Environmental Conditions
VCs adjust their investments according to market signals such as the general boom and
bust cycles of the public equity markets, and economic growth. We control for total
VC funding in the previous year which is positively related to good funding conditions
(Gompers et al., 2008; Cherif & Gazdar, 2011; Félix et al., 2013).
Favorable institutional environments such as a strong corporate governance and
investor protection increase the power to mitigate agency conflicts (Cumming et al.,
2010; Jeng & Wells, 2000). We control for the home country of the venture firm to
address the impact of different institutional environments.
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At last, we control for venture firm’s industry sector to account for unobserved
sector-specific fixed effects.
4.4 Empirical Results
In our sample, the average duration of a financing round is 593 days, approximately
19.5 months. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables.
None of the correlations are sources of concern for multi-collinearity.
To apply the difference-in-difference approach, we identify firms fraught with en-
dogenous risk based on industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio and market-to-book ratio; and
financing rounds exposed to exogenous risk based on the aggregate level of market price
volatility at the funding date. We use log rank test statistic to estimate break-point
values of the variables. For any R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ra-
tio, or level of the VStoxx 50 Index above the break-point value, we assign the project,
resp. the financing round to be exposed to endogenous, resp. exogenous risk. We ap-
ply the method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) to estimate the break-point values. The
method is an outcome-oriented approach to compute break-point values corresponding
to its most significant relation with the outcome, and is designed for survival analysis
with censored data. We compare our break-point values to median values in Table 3.
The break-point value of the R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio is higher than its median
value. The higher break-point value indicates that only high levels of R&D intensity
increase endogenous risk. The break-point value for market-to-book ratio equals its
median value. The break-point value for the VStoxx 50 Index is lower than its median
value. The lower break-point value indicates that even low levels of exogenous risk
provide the VC an opportunity to take advantage of the delay option.
We show the results from the duration analysis in Table 4. Estimation (1) is
the baseline model that includes the control variables. We find that VCs adjust the
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timing of investments according to the contract design, the availability of firm-specific
information, and environmental conditions. Estimations (2) to (6) add information
about exogenous and endogenous risk. The new information does not change the
impact of the control variables.
The first hypothesis states that VCs delay subsequent investments to wait for infor-
mational updates about the market conditions when exogenous risk is high. We include
the dummy variable Market Uncertainty in estimations (2), (4), (5) to analyze the
impact of exogenous risk on the duration of the financing round. Market Uncertainty
is equal to one if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the break-point value, and zero other-
wise. We find that VCs defer investments with respect to exogenous risk. In estimation
(2), we model the duration based on the control variables and Market Uncertainty.
Market Uncertainty increases the duration by approximately two months. This cor-
responds to 9% of the average duration of a financing round. In estimation (4),
we add information about project’s endogenous risk. The impact of the variable
Market Uncertainty remains unchanged. In estimation (5), we consider interde-
pendence of exogenous and endogenous risk. The impact of the variable Market
Uncertainty increases compared to estimations (2) and (4); in estimation (5) Market
Uncertainty increases the duration by approximately three months. This corresponds
to 14% of the average duration of a financing round. We explain this observation by a
high value of the delay option. Considering interdependence of exogenous and endoge-
nous risk, we find that the impact of Market Uncertainty increases. This indicates
that endogenous risk restricts the delay of investments.
The second hypothesis states that VCs advance subsequent investments to advance
the discovery process when endogenous risk is high. We include the dummy variables
R&D Intensity and Growth Opportunities in estimations (3), (4), (5) to analyze the
impact of endogenous risk on the duration of financing events. R&D Intensity, resp.
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Growth Opportunities is equal to one if industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio, resp. market-
to-book ratio is above the break-point value, and zero otherwise. We find that VCs ad-
vance investments with respect to endogenous risk. In estimation (3), we model the du-
ration based on the control variables and R&D Intensity and Growth Opportunities.
R&D Intensity decreases the duration by approximately two and a half months. This
corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing round. Growth Opportunities
does not impact the duration. In estimation (4), we add information about exogenous
risk at the funding date. The impact of the variables remains unchanged. When in-
terdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk is considered in estimation (5), the
impact of the variable R&D intensity slightly increases compared to estimations (3)
and (4); in estimation (5) R&D Intensity decreases the duration by approximately
three months. This corresponds to 14% of the average duration of a financing round.
Growth Opportunities increase the duration for a low exogenous risk but decrease du-
ration for a high exogenous risk. We explain the results by the initiation of a discovery
process.
The third hypothesis states that VCs accelerate subsequent investments when ex-
ogenous and endogenous risk are high. In estimation (5), we consider interdependence
of exogenous and endogenous risk by an interaction term of Market Uncertainty, and
R&D Intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities. The interaction terms are equal to
one if Market Uncertainty, and R&D intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities are
equal to one, and zero otherwise. We find that interaction of exogenous and endoge-
nous risk accelerates investments. Market Uncertainty does not affect the duration
of financing rounds differently with respect to R&D Intensity. Market Uncertainty
does not accelerate investments to projects that are fraught with endogenous risk,
when measured by industries R&D Intensity. Market Uncertainty, however, affects
the duration of financing rounds differently with respect to Growth Opportunities.
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Market Uncertainty accelerates investments to projects that are fraught with endoge-
nous risk, when measured by industries Growth Opportunities by approximately two
and a half months. This corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing
round. We explain the result by an acceleration of the discovery process.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Mean Std. Min Max (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Internal Risk
(a) R&D-expenditures-to-sales 0.200 0.291 0.000 1.004
(b) Market-to-book 6.188 3.561 1.070 28.927 -0.002
External Risk
(c) VStoxx 0.235 0.101 0.116 0.875 -0.022 * -0.185 ***
Contract Design
(d) Debt 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 0.583 0.424 0.893
(e) Funding Size (mio. e) 3.185 8.705 0.002 502.740 0.095 *** -0.019 -0.003 -0.025 **
(f) Syndication 0.576 0.494 0.000 1.000 0.054 *** 0.020 * -0.008 -0.083 *** 0.125 ***
0.000 0.080 0.502 0.000 0.000
Endogenous Information
(g) Firm’s Age (Days) 1871 1987 0 38130 0.008 -0.020 * -0.006 0.066 *** 0.068 *** -0.019
(h) IPO 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000 0.141 *** 0.022 * -0.004 0.002 0.108 *** 0.036 *** 0.066 ***
(i) Tradesale 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000 -0.021 * 0.102 *** -0.053 *** 0.051 *** 0.047 *** 0.067 *** 0.013 -0.152 ***
0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.000
Environmental Conditions
(j) Total VC Funding (mio. e) 3707 927 2671 5529 -0.014 -0.057 *** 0.461 *** 0.064 *** -0.031 *** -0.001 -0.013 0.006 0.045 ***
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Table 3: Variable Break-points
We identify firms fraught with endogenous risk based on industries’ R&D-to-sales ratio and market-to-book ratio; and financing rounds fraught with exogenous risk based on the
aggregate level of market price volatility at the funding date. We apply the method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) to dichotomize the variables and use log rank test statistic to
estimate break-point values of the variables. For any R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio, market-to-book ratio, or level of the VStoxx 50 Index above the break-point value, we assign
the project, resp. the financing round to be exposed to endogenous, resp. exogenous risk. The method of Contal & O’Quigley (1999) is an outcome-oriented approach to compute
break-point values corresponding on its most significant relation with the outcome, and is designed for survival analysis with censored data.
R&D-expenditures-to-sales Market-to-book VStoxx 50
Median 0.071 5.573 21.160
Break-point (Contal and O’Quigley, 1999) 0.113 5.538 19.900
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Table 4: Duration Analysis
Accelerated failure time model. Weibull distribution of the error term. Dependent: Duration of a financing round, defined as the time
between two subsequent financing events. The model is fit to the natural logarithm of the duration. Independent: R&D Intensity
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999)
break-point value, and zero otherwise. Growth Opportunities is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry market-to-book
ratio ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise. Market Uncertainty is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value at the funding date, and zero otherwise.
The interaction variables are equal to 1 if Market Uncertainty and R&D Intensity, resp. Growth Opportunities are equal to 1, and zero
otherwise.
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, **indicates significance at the 5% significance level, * indicates significance at the
10% significance level. a indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 1% significance level based on type-3-effect analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 11.354 *** 13.100 *** 11.286 *** 12.894 *** 12.678 *** 8.699 ***
1.257 1.410 1.252 1.411 0.131 1.579
Endogenous Risk
R&D Intensity -0.120 *** -0.113 *** -0.134 *** -0.096 **
0.032 0.032 0.044 0.045
Growth Opportunities 0.017 0.030 0.099 ** 0.069
0.029 0.029 0.043 0.044
Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty 0.085 *** 0.078 ** 0.131 *** 0.212 ***
0.030 0.030 0.043 0.045
Joint Effect of Endogenous and Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty*R&D Intensity 0.022 0.012
0.057 0.057
Market Uncertainty*Growth Opportunities -0.121 ** -0.119 **
0.057 0.057
Contract Design
Debt -0.489 *** -0.485 *** -0.481 *** -0.478 *** -0.478 *** -0.466 ***
0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
Log (Funding Size) -0.018 * -0.019 * -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.017 * -0.024 **
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
Syndication -0.077 *** -0.076 *** -0.078 *** -0.077 *** -0.077 *** -0.072 **
0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
Firm-specific Information
Log (Firm’s Age) 0.062 *** 0.060 *** 0.061 *** 0.060 *** 0.059 *** 0.058 ***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
IPO -1.019 *** -1.013 *** -1.014 *** -1.009 *** -0.827 *** -0.994 ***
0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.030 0.051
Tradesale -0.845 *** -0.835 *** -0.834 *** -0.827 *** -0.478 *** -0.813 ***
0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.042 0.030
Environmental Conditions
Log (Total VC Funding) -0.183 *** -0.264 *** -0.179 *** -0.254 *** -0.245 *** -0.219 ***
0.057 0.064 0.056 0.064 0.065 0.064
Firm’s Country included a included a included a included a included a included a
Firm’s Industry Sector included a included a included a included a included a included a
Market Timing of the VC
Log (Stock Market) 0.431 ***
0.077
N 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336 7,336
Weibull Shape 1.079 1.079 1.079 1.080 1.080 1.083
Log Likelihood -10,120 -10,116 -10,113 -10,110 -10,108 -10,092
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4.5 Robustness Checks
In estimation (6), we control for the aggregate level of equity valuation by the Euro
Stoxx 50 Equity Price Index. This is done for two reasons: first, fund managers win-
dow dress their investments towards extant valuations to impress sponsors (Lakonishok
et al., 1991). Exogenous risk might be related to window dressing of the VC if market
uncertainty and market valuation is correlated. If so, the impact of exogenous risk
might account for window dressing activities instead of a strategic investment decision.
Second, endogenous risk estimated by the market-to-book ratio might be biased toward
the aggregate level of equity valuation. By its nature, the level of the market-to-book
ratio is impacted by market valuation in the time series. We might assign more projects
to be fraught with growth opportunities whose funding take place in periods of high a
market valuation. In estimation (6),Market Uncertainty increases the delay of invest-
ments by approximately four and a half months. This corresponds to 24% of the average
duration of a financing round. The impact of Market Uncertainty does not vanish
when controlling for window dressing activities, indicating that Market Uncertainty
comprises strategic investing. Growth Opportunities do not impact the duration for
a low level of exogenous risk, indicating that the positive impact estimated in estima-
tion (5) is driven by the selection bias. The interaction term Market Uncertainty∗
Growth Opportunities is still negative, its magnitude does not change when compared
to estimation (5).
Krohmer et al. (2009) analyze the investment decision of the VC related to en-
dogenous and exogenous risk by the development stage of the project: they argue that
endogenous risk is more present in early stages of the project when uncertainty about
entrepreneur’s effort and ability is high; whereas exogenous risk is more present in later
stages of the project when the VC decides about an exit, or writing off the project. We
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do sub-sample regressions based on project’s investment status. We model failure time
of projects’ initial financing round to address timing of investments in the early stage
of the project; and failure time of subsequent financing rounds of the same project to
address timing of investments in later stages of the projects. Results are shown in table
5.
In estimation (7) and (8), we model the duration based on projects’ initial financing
round. The average duration of the financing rounds is 664 days, approximately 22
months. In estimation (7) we estimate the effects of exogenous and endogenous risk
separately. In estimation (8) we consider interdependence of exogenous and endogenous
risk. Market Uncertainty has no impact on the duration in estimation (7), but has
a slightly significant impact in estimation (8). Exogenous risk only slightly impact
the duration of early stage projects, indicating that the delay of investments is not
valuable in early stages. R&D Intensity strongly decreases the duration by almost
seven months, corresponding to 30% of the average duration of a financing round.
Growth Opportunities do not impact the duration.
In estimation (9) and (10), we model the duration based on the same projects’ sub-
sequent financing rounds. The average duration of the financing rounds is 564 days,
approximately 18.5 months. In estimation (9) we estimate the effects of exogenous and
endogenous risk separately, in estimation (10) we consider interdependence of exoge-
nous and endogenous risk. Market Uncertainty increases the duration by approxi-
mately two and a half months in estimation (9), corresponding to 14% of the average
duration of a financing round; and by almost four months in model (10), corresponding
to 20% of the average duration of a financing round. R&D Intensity decreases the
duration by approximately one month in model (9), corresponding to 7% of the average
duration of a financing round; and by almost two month in estimation (10), correspond-
ing to 10% of the average duration of a financing round. Growth Opportunities do
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not impact the duration in estimation (9); and increase duration by almost two month
in model (10), corresponding to 10% of the average duration of a financing round.
The interaction term Market Uncertainty∗Growth Opportunities is negative. The
magnitude is the same when compared to estimation (5) and (6). We find that the
delay option is valuable in later stages of the project, when compared to early stages.
Consequently, opportunity loss is more present in later stages of the project.
We test the fit of estimation (5) compared to alternative parametric estimations.
We present likelihood-ratio statistics and correlations of predicted and observed failure
times in table 6. Log-likelihoods are slightly higher for an exponential and log-normal
distribution of the error term when compared to the Weibull model we use. Our results
do not change if we apply an exponential or log-normal model. To calculate correlations
of predicted and observed failure times, we proceed as follows: we predict individual
failure time P by estimation (5) that includes all information about endogenous and
exogenous risk. We transform the predicted failure times into censored data. We censor
predicted failure times that exceed the pre-fixed time of five years. We correlate the
simulated sample and the true sample to estimate the correlation coefficients. The cor-
relation coefficients are approximately 0.38 for all models, and statistically significant
at p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Duration Analysis: Early Stage and Later Stages
Accelerated failure time model. Weibull distribution of the error term. Model (7) and (8) estimate the duration based on projects’
initial financing round. Model (9) and (10) estimate the duration based on the same projects’ subsequent financing rounds. Dependent:
Duration of a financing round, defined as the time between two subsequent financing events. The model is fit to the natural logarithm
of the duration. Independent: R&D Intensity is a dummy variable equal to 1 if venture firm’s industry R&D-expenditures-to-sales ratio
is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise. Growth Opportunities is a dummy variable equal to
1 if venture firm’s industry market-to-book ratio ratio is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value, and zero otherwise.
Market Uncertainty is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the VStoxx 50 Index is above the Contal and O’Quigley (1999) break-point value
at the funding date, and zero otherwise. The interaction variables are equal to 1 if Market Uncertainty and R&D Intensity, resp. Growth
Opportunities are equal to 1, and zero otherwise. Additionally we control for the financing instrument and quality more precisely;
financing instruments are Debt, Convertible Debt, Equity Swap; and including a control for bankruptcy, indicating low quality.
*** indicates significance at the 1% significance level, **indicates significance at the 5% significance level, * indicates significance at
the 10% significance level. a indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 1% significance level based on type-3-effect
analysis. c indicates that the classification variables are significant at the 10% significance level based on type-3-effect analysis.
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 10.571 *** 10.059 *** 14.082 *** 13.898 ***
2.605 2.632 1.694 1.713
Endogenousl Risk
R&D Intensity -0.260 *** -0.256 *** -0.066 * -0.093 *
0.060 0.080 0.037 0.053
Growth Opportunities 0.035 0.113 0.021 0.093 *
0.052 0.076 0.034 0.052
Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty 0.041 0.128 * 0.132 *** 0.185 ***
0.054 0.074 0.037 0.053
Joint Effect of Endogenous and Exogenous Risk
Market Uncertainty*R&D Intensity -0.045 0.032
0.105 0.067
Market Uncertainty*Growth Opportunities -0.151 -0.125 *
0.100 0.068
Contract Design
Debt -1.642 *** -1.619 *** -0.280 *** -0.279 ***
0.399 0.399 0.060 0.072
Convertible Debt -1.351 *** -1.351 *** -0.463 *** -0.466 ***
0.185 0.185 0.037 0.053
Equity Swap 0.097 *** 0.092 ***
0.059 0.170
Log (Funding Size) 0.034 * 0.034 * -0.030 ** -0.030 **
0.018 0.018 0.013 0.013
Syndication -0.047 -0.047 -0.049 -0.049
0.048 0.048 0.035 0.035
Firm-specific Information
Log (Firm’s Age) 0.077 *** 0.076 *** 0.120 *** 0.118 ***
0.012 0.012 0.020 0.021
IPO -0.809 *** -0.803 *** -0.970 *** -0.971 ***
0.108 0.107 0.060 0.060
Tradesale -0.645 *** -0.641 *** -0.787 *** -0.788 ***
0.058 0.058 0.037 0.037
Bankrupt 0.509 *** 0.514 *** 0.319 *** 0.324 ***
0.088 0.088 0.059 0.059
Environmental Conditions
Log (Total VC Funding) -0.183 -0.161 -0.328 *** -0.320 ***
0.119 0.120 0.076 0.077
Firm’s Country included a included a included a included a
Firm’s Industry Sector included c included c included a included a
N 2,421 2,421 4,915 4,915
Weibull Shape 1.137 1.138 1.076 1.077
Log Likelihood -3,095 -3,094 -6,915 -6,913
35
Table 6: Fit Statistics
The sample is the observed failure time, in days. PWeibull is the predicted failure time by the accelerated failure time model using Weibull distribution of the error term. PExponential,
PGamma, PLlogistic, PLnormal are the predicted failure from exponential, general-Gamma, log-logistic modeling, and log-normal modeling. The log likelihood is reported for the
respective models.
Log Likelihood Sample PWeibull PExponential PGamma PLlogistic
Sample
PWeibull -10,108 0.380 ***
PExponential -10,128 0.379 *** 0.999 ***
PGamma -10,041 0.380 *** 0.995 *** 0.995 ***
PLlogistic -10,024 0.377 *** 0.978 *** 0.978 *** 0.993 ***
PLnormal -10,136 0.376 *** 0.974 *** 0.974 *** 0.991 *** 0.997 ***
36
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the optimal timing of investments in a set-up with exogenous
and endogenous risk. We consider interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk in
that the strength of endogenous agency risk is related to the level of exogenous market
risk. This refers to the idea of a relative value of private benefits: in periods of high
market uncertainty, the entrepreneur’s expected payoff from the project is downgraded.
Private benefits from managing the firm become more attractive to the entrepreneur
relative to the successful realization of the project. As a consequence, his incentive to
behave opportunistically increases.
We analyze the investment decision from a real options perspective. The VC can
reduce his exposer to exogenous risk by delaying investment and mitigate endogenous
risk by investing. If exogenous risk is particularly high, the VC has to increase the share
vested to the entrepreneur to keep him expending effort in the hard times. Also, the
tightened agency risk forces the VC to accelerate investments to aggregate information
about the effort of the entrepreneur. As a result, the VC abandons a fraction of his
delay option. In that, the discovery restricts the value of the delay option. This
strongly decreases the value of his investment and thus arises high opportunity loss.
The interdependence of exogenous and endogenous risk on the timing of investments
is economically significant in the real world. We find that VCs accelerate investments to
projects fraught with endogenous risk in periods of high market uncertainty by approx-
imately two and a half months when compared to periods of low market uncertainty.
This corresponds to 13% of the average duration of a financing round. Furthermore,
we find that the delay option is more valuable in later stages of a project when the
VC decides about an exit, or writing off the project. Consequently, opportunity loss is
more present in the later stages of a venture project.
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Our paper has several implications for theory and practice. This study contributes
to the extant research on agency risk in venture finance. So far, papers have considered
agency conflicts in venture projects to be time invariant (Bergemann & Hege, 1998;
Neher, 1999; Cornelli & Yosha, 2003). We show that this assumption is not realistic.
Moreover, the strength of agency conflicts is influenced by exogenous factors and varies
over time. We present one of those, namely market uncertainty.
On the one hand, our results might help to explain observed return patterns of
VC portfolios by an agency perspective. Since agency conflicts are the main reason
for the existence of a VC industry (Amit et al., 1998), it is reasonable that they have
a considerable impact on the realized returns. Cochrane (2005) shows that return
patterns of VC portfolios characterize through a high alpha and a high market beta.
First, the alpha accounts for abnormal return that can not be explained by common
risk factors. The real options perspective might explain the phenomenon: VC investors
successfully apply stage financing to reduce downside losses. This results in an option
like payoff structure, where the option premium accounts for the alpha. Second, the
high market beta accounts for a high sensitivity of the return to market risk. Out
idea of a relative value of private benefits might explain the phenomenon: agency
risk tightens in a period of high market uncertainty and forces the VC to accelerate
investments. As a result, the timing of VC investments is biased toward periods of
high market risk.
The results suggest the implementation of contractual claims that focus in particular
on the mitigation of agency conflicts in an environment of high exogenous risk. From
the perspective of the entrepreneur, exogenous market risk can be viewed as a high-risk
employment situation. The entrepreneur will lose his employment and future income
if the VC decides to abandon the project. Amernic (1984) and Eisenhardt (1989) show
that the principal has to compensate the cost of risky employment to retain managers
38
in high-risk situations. A fix compensation payment in periods of high exogenous risk
acts like a put-option: the entrepreneur can sell his shares to the VC at a pre-fixed price
if the project’s value is below a critical level. The compensation payment reduces the
relative value of private benefits in periods of high market risk, relaxing entrepreneur’s
incentive to behave opportunistically. This will allow the VC to capitalize on a larger
proportion of the delay option when it is most valuable.
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